Revolution(s) in Latin America from Bolivia to Chile Essay Example for Free

Revolution(s) in Latin America from Bolivia to Chile Essay This paper will deal briefly with the revolutionary movement in Latin America in the mid 20th Century. It will compare and contrast Bolivia, Cuba, Chile and Argentina and seek to draw lessons for today. Ultimately, Peron proved the most successful model of revolution, and this only because of his strong ability to mobilize disparate elements of the population often left out of more doctrinaire Marxist movements. I. This paper will briefly deal with four related but distinct elements: first, the revolution in Bolivia in 1952, the revolution in Cuba a short time later, and the failed revolution in Chile after the 1970 elections. After this, it will deal with the Peron regime in Argentina. Given all this, this paper will attempt to compare and contrast these movements, looking at US as well as Soviet policy relative to them, and see what modern policymakers can take from these immensely important events. The Bolivian revolution of 1952 was one of the first major earthshaking events in post World War II Latin America. Bolivia was an economic disaster since the war (and before) dependent largely on tin exports and a small amount of coffee for economic survival (Cockcroft, 1997). Like all three revolutions dealt within this section, the big issue was the ownership of land. In countries largely made up of peasants, this was the greatest issue. In all three of these states, the land was owned in large parcels, by a small oligarchy that had connections with the government. This was the key in all three revolutions (Kohl, 1978). One issue that sets Bolivia apart was the fact that the army was rather uninterested in pursuing a battle against the revolutionaries, who, unlike the Chilean case, were far from â€Å"Marxist† in ideological orientation (Kohl, 1978, 239). The revolutionary movement (MNR) was both nationalist and socialist in orientation, seeking an independent and prosperous Bolivia independent of both USSR and USA. The basic platform of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement was land reform first of all, the nationalization of the tin industry and free elections. The connection with the USA was seen by the MNR as a link between to so-called â€Å"tin barons† and the army through US aid. This was a similar view in Cuba. After a brief period of fighting, roughly the middle of April in 1952, the main urban centers fell to the revolutionary movement with the help of miners and other urban workers (the farmers took little part) who were armed by the MNR (Kohl, 1978). The army had no stomach for a fight, and put up token resistance. It was not long before the founder of the MNR, Victor Paz Estemssono, took power as president, and immediately purged the army and engaged in land reform. Universal suffrage was quickly instituted by the new government, and the tin mines were brought under state control. It is clear in hindsight that military personnel were involved in the initial uprising in early April in 1952, the army saw no threat in the nationalist movement and was loathe to fight it. This was to make the Bolivian revolution different from the revolutions in Cuba and Chile (cf. Gerassi, 1965, esp ch 16). In Cuba, 1953, the economic situation was the same for the peasants, but not for the economy as a whole. Unlike the depressed Bolivian situation, the Cuban economy was booming in 1953, except for the fact that the boom did not affect the middle and lower sectors of the peasantry. The economic boom was based on several things: the endless American demand for sugar, the investment of the Batista government in tourism and gambling (similar to Lebanon at the same time), and the presence of a substantial Jewish and Italian organized crime who ran drugs out of the island (Blasier, 1967). Nevertheless, the peasants were largely illiterate and suffering from hunger and disease, similar to that of Bolivia. Like all the revolutions dealt with here, land imbalance was the key. Here, the sugar plantations were in the hands of domestic and foreign oligarchs, Like Tin in Bolivia or Copper in Chile, in Cuba, the revolutionary movement, modeled after that of the MNR in Bolivia (that is, both nationalist and socialist), sought land reform and free elections. The Batista government had rigged elections for some time to make sure him and his military cronies were placed in power regularly (Cockcroft, 1997). Unlike the Bolivian case, the Cuban army was basically loyal to Batista and fought the revolutionaries for some time. The US government did place some pressure on the Cuban leader to hold free elections, which he largely refused to do, leading the CIA to offer some limited financial support to Castro early on (Blasier, 1967). Ultimately, the revolutionaries forced Batista to flee to the US, and the army took over more fully, leading to a protracted war. Hidden in the mountains and fields of southeastern Cuba, the revolutionaries defeated Batista’s small and poorly coordinated offensive. The US posture was uncertain until substantial aid developed from the USSR, and, after Castro’s victory, nationalization of sugar plantations and other assets deprived Cubans and Americans of their former fortunes (Marfelli, 1998). Unlike the Bolivian case, free elections were never held. Chile paints a similar picture. Like the other two states dealt with here, Chile was also a one resource exporter, in her case, copper. The revolution, which did not succeed, begins at the elections of 1970, where the semi-Marxist Salvador Allende received roughly 36% of the vote in a tightly contested three way race. Hardly a ringing endorsement, the KGB as well as the CIA back differing parties in this contest. Both intelligence agencies saw Chile and its copper as a major strategic asset, and both wanted to see Chile in their sphere of influence. The difference being that the CIA spent money to defeat Allende (in general), the Soviets spent money to elect Allende (specifically), even giving him a private salary while on the campaign trail. Allende will never get more than 40% of the vote, and hence, more radical measures were necessary (Leonov, 2005). Allende’s victory was a blow to US interests, and Richard Nixon set his face against the new government, who quickly permitted a substantial KGB presence in the country and allied himself with Castro. Even more, the Allende government nationalized the copper mines and engaged in some limited land reform, like all the above. Allende’s policies, however, created substantial economic downturns in Chile: while attempting to raise wages, he increased inflation. Price fixing brought shortages of necessary items to Santiago and other important urban areas. Unemployment went up, and copper exports fell. Soon, the army and many citizens were opposed to the government that was seen to be artificially propped up by Soviet subsidies. The fact that the opposition parties were contesting the election did not help matters, and in the two elections before Allende’s death, he received no more than 40% of the vote in tight races. The famous coup that brought General Pinochet to power was the result. (Leonov, 2005). These three revolutionary movements, briefly sketched above, contain many important similarities to one another. In all cases, the governments that preceded the revolutions were basically oligarchic: a small number of wealthy controlling a substantially disproportionate share of wealth. Each of these governments was largely militarized and the military was seen as basically supporting the state (with some hesitation in Bolivia). Each of the governments before the revolutionaries seem rather a-ideological, more or less existing to collect taxes and keep a certain group in power. In each case, the armies were basically autonomous forces, making decisions more or less apart from the states that allegedly controlled them. All three states were basically single-resource dependent which harms the sovereignty of the state. Decisions cannot be made autonomously when the entire state’s economy is based on copper markets (for example) that exist far outside the country. The revolutionary movements also have substantial similarities. Both were ideologically nationalist as well as socialist, both in the broad sense of the terms. They sought a redistribution of land and nationalization of the main source of national income: tin, sugar, copper. All of these movements sought violent measures to take power. Even the Allende government used his â€Å"red guards† to confiscate the goods of the people they considered â€Å"rich,† to harm the black market. But as the Leonov lectures prove, all of these movements, legitimate or not, were hijacked by KGB forces and used to increase Soviet power in the area. Hence, whatever sympathy the US may have had with these movements (such as it had to the early Castro) quickly evaporated once the KGB moved in, putting the US in a bad position, having to appear as the â€Å"defender of the oligarchy† against the â€Å"apostles of equality. † It seems that the Soviets forced the American hand in these matters. There are also several differences within these movements. The posture of the army was important: in Chile and Cuba, the army was loyal, in Bolivia, they seemed to have no stomach for a fight. In all cases, the army was relatively small and poorly equipped. A well financed revolutionary movement could easily be a march for these rather unprofessional military forces. The results of the revolution differed wildly. In Chile, the economy tanked. In Cuba, free elections were never held, and Castro held the country in an iron grip under Soviet subsidies. In Bolivia, the economy improved and land distribution was a fact. This is the greatest lesson of these movements: there is no guarantee of success. There is a guarantee that an old oligarchy is to replace a new one the unfortunate results of revolution. All the revolutionaries, with varying degrees of success, sought to improve the role of women in society and in the economy. To a large extent, the revolutionaries had a substantial share of women among their members. In Chile, the Allende government creates subsidy plans for free milk distribution to poor families, a policy difficult to argue with. However, when his price fixing scheme appeared early into his presidency, these milk distributions dried up, and families were forced to buy on the black market at inflated prices. Here, the female side fo the revolution was a complete failure, and mothers were worse off than before. It seems clear that the price fixing scheme was a failure and might well have been the main reason the revolution failed: shortages occurred and the black market sprang up. Allende’s violent methods of dealing with these alienated many people. It is hard to see any real alterative (in 1973) in Chile for women than to support the coup and the freeing of prices for milk and other necessaries. II. Juan Peron is one of the most celebrated Latin American personalities. He contained within himself the true ethical content of the Latin American revolutionaries without being a revolutionary. Nonviolent and patriotic, he offered Argentina everything it needed politically. The Perons were part of Argentinian politics through the World War II era, and Juan’s position in the military government (as vice president under General Eldomiro Farrell) permitted him a platform to argue in favor of unionization and nationalism, in speeches and policies that made him wildly popular. Combining nationalism, patriotism and socialism, this set of ingredients was all that was necessary to bring a coalition of left and right into being over questions of economic nationalism and equality. The fact that he married a woman of lowborn status, Eva, the real power behind Juan (Van Dine, 1998) who used her popularity to engage in serious welfare programs and mobilization of the â€Å"shirtless ones† to her and her husband’s side created a duo that has not been seen since. Peron was a man of his word. In his first term as president (until 1952) he engaged in a flurry of domestic policies that went beyond the socialist rhetoric of the revolutions described above. In the seminal work on Latin American revolutions by Gerassi (1965, esp. ch 3), he provides a provision list of the major areas of concern and policy for the Peron duo. Peron’s list of accomplishments is stunning: social security was made mandatory for each citizen. He was behind the creation of trade unions in every major Argentinian industry. He made certain that elections were free and that universal suffrage was the norm. Insofar as the treatment of women were concerned, he insisted on paid maternity leave, free medical care (especially prenatal care) and paid time off for all new mothers. He built recreation centers for all major industries, and made sure that paid vacations were the norm for all workers in Argentina. And this was only the beginning (cf. Gerassi for more details). Just as important, he sought the development of Argentina’s economic diversification. This is a substantial difference between Peron and the other movements dealt with above. The other movements did not have a substantial plan for diversification and were basically content to be one crop country. Argentina was not like this, there were too many resources to be mobilized, and such diversification became a major project of the Argentinian first couple in the 1950s. Peron was an amateur philosopher of sorts, and saw political ideology as more of a barrier than an impetus to economic performance and equality. His basic philosophical position was called Justicalisimo, or the â€Å"third way† between socialism and capitalism that attempted to combine the positive contributions of both. This approach will be imitated by Nasser in Egypt and the Bolivian MNR. But it is precisely this approach to political things that makes sense out of his popularity: there was no prepackaged ideology to oppose. His was a mixture of the best of the left with the best of capitalism. Both of these were blended with an appeal to nationalism, patriotism and Argentinian sovereignty that was immensely popular. He was able, through his own personality as well as that of his wife, to mobilize both left and right over questions of economic nationalism and equality. Most certainly, his policies were not typical for Latin America or anywhere else. There are few people who can claim his mantle. This paper mentioned Nasser of Egypt, and is likely the only one who can claim this. Peron did not seek a violent revolution. He sought a revolution based in patriotism and national consent, a nation rebuilt around the â€Å"first couple,† who were iconic in their times and ours. This is a rare chemistry that cannot be imitated by professional guerillas or politicians of the typical stripe. The fact that he put his promises immediately into action and fought the wealthy of society made him more and more popular, and this popularity, ths ability to mobilize the population, is what made the oligarchy fear him, yet there was little they could do. The Eva Peron Foundation, a huge semi-official charitable trust, built thousands of schools and hospitals around the country. The government of Argentina was truly a family affair, mirroring the actual Argentinian family itself, it was iconic almost literally, in that they were ruled not by a junta, or a general, or a rich man, but a family. In this writer’s opinion, Peron’s popularity was based on what he physically accomplished. But more than this, it was the mixture of patriotism and economic nationalism and equality. Since cliche Marxism is anti-patriotic and internationalist as well as anti-Christian, they naturally alienate many of these types of people. Peron did not do this, since he was nationalist and did not repress the church as did Castro. Hence, he was able to mobilize these people as well, adding to his popularity in a way that a Castro or Allende could not. There is so much material on this Argentinean leader that this brief description cannot do it justice. III. This paper has sought to deal with the question of Latin American Revolution in brief. It is clear by this time that this writer is partial to Peron, and sees his model as superior to the others dealt with above, and offers quite a bit of material for the future of Latin America. The revolutions of Cuba, Bolivia and Chile were, when all is said and done, failures. While correctly addressing many important issues, these revolutionaries simply became another oligarchy, or fell apart altogether (such as Allende). These states are still poor and underdeveloped, and only Chile has been able to control infant mortality with any success. The problems in all these countries were the same: one crop dependency, oligarchy, land hunger and poor infrastructure. Only Peron performed substantial moves to remedy this situation, but his later overthrow proved these abortive. Argentina was back where it had started. Cuba today is an economic disaster and a dictatorship, while Bolivia is no better off than in 1952. Nationalism, patriotism, autarky and economic equality are the wave of the future, while internationalist socialism(as well as border-less capitalism) is a relic of the past. Bibliography Kohl, James. (1978) â€Å"Peasant and Revolution in Bolivia, April 9, 1952-August 2, 1953. † The American Historical Review. 58: 238-259 Blasier, Cole (1967). â€Å"Studies of Social revolution: Origins in Mexico, Bolivia and Cuba. † Latin American Research Review. 2: 28-64 Perez, Marfelli. (1998) The Cuban Revolution. Oxford University Press. Leonov, Aledander (2005) â€Å"Soviet Intelligence in Latin America During the Cold War. † Lectures. The Center for Academic Publications. (http://www. cepchile. cl/dms/lang_2/doc_1140. html) Van Dine, Robert. (1998) â€Å"Evita Peron: Saint or Coutesan. † Vandine Publishing. (http://www. vandine. com/peron. htm; Van Dine is a career DC diplomat) Gerassi, John. (1965) The Great Fear in Latin America. Macmillan, 1965. (This work acted as background material for all the information above) Cockcroft, James D. (1997) Latin America: History, Politics, and U. S. Policy. Nelson Hall Publishers.